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Admiralty
by John P. Kavanagh, Jr.*
The cases discussed herein represent decisions the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued in 2016 and 2017.1 While
not an all-inclusive list of maritime decisions from the court during that
timeframe, the Author identified and provided summaries of key rulings
2
of interest to the maritime practitioner.
I. ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
Tundidor v. Miami-Dade County,3 addresses subject matter
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333;4 specifically, the case addresses
whether a canal is "navigable" for purposes of admiralty or maritime
jurisdiction if it is blocked by artificial obstructions preventing it from
being used to conduct interstate commerce. 5 In a case of apparent first
impression, the appellate court agreed with the trial court's decision to
6
dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

*Partner in the firm of Burr & Forman LLP; Co-Chair of the firm's Transportation and
Maritime Practice Group. University of South Alabama (B.A., summa cum laude, 1989);
Tulane University School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 1992). Member, Maritime Law
Association of the United States; Southeastern Admiralty Law Institute; Propeller Club
(Port of Mobile). Member, State Bars of Mississippi and Alabama.
1. For an analysis of admiralty law during the prior survey period, see John P.
Kavanagh, Jr., Admiralty, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 67 MERCER L. REV. 789 (2016).
2. Many of the decisions were not identified by the court for publication. However, the
West National Reporter System "publishes" these non-published opinions in the Federal
Appendix. Pursuant to Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, citation to an
unpublished opinion is allowed. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1. Further, Eleventh Circuit Rule 36-2
notes that, while not binding precedent, unpublished opinions "may be cited as persuasive
authority." 11TH CIR. R. 36-2.
3. 831 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2016).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (2018) (vesting federal district courts with "original jurisdiction,
exclusive of the courts of the States, of . . . [any civil case of admiralty or maritime
jurisdiction").
5. Tundidor, 831 F.3d at 1330.
6. Id.
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The plaintiff, a passenger aboard a recreational vessel, suffered
serious injuries while the vessel was operating on the Coral Park Canal
in Miami, Florida. The canal is traversed by a number of low-lying
bridges. After ducking to pass underneath such a structure, the plaintiff
raised his head only to strike a water pipe, causing serious injury.7 Suit
was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida, invoking the admiralty jurisdiction of the court.8
The test for admiralty tort jurisdiction is twofold: "(1) there must be a
significant relationship between the alleged wrong and traditional
maritime activity (the nexus requirement) and (2) the tort must have
occurred on navigable waters (the location requirement)." 9 In the instant
case, the trial court found that the Coral Park Canal was not navigable,
and thus, failed to satisfy the location requirement. 10
The test for navigable waters was set forth in The DANIEL BALL.11
The Supreme Court of the United States held that navigable waters must
be "navigable in fact" and capable of being used in interstate commerce. 12
The Coral Park Canal does connect to the Tamiami Canal, which in
turn connects to the Miami River and eventually leads to the Atlantic
Ocean. However, the Coral Park Canal is restricted by a, series of
artificial obstructions, including a water control structure (S-25B), which
prevents navigation from the western side of the structure to the Miami
River. 13 Coral Park Canal is not navigable because this water control
structure prevents vessels from traveling outside of the State of Florida. 14
"Because the Coral Park Canal cannot support interstate commerce, it
cannot satisfy the location requirement of admiralty jurisdiction."1 5
Whether Coral Park Canal might have once been navigable had no
bearing on the issue of whether the waterway was presently navigable in
fact. Discussing the issue of "historical navigability," the Eleventh
Circuit noted that "[e]very circuit court to consider the issue has ruled
that when artificial obstructions on a waterway block interstate
commercial travel,
the waterway cannot support admiralty

7. Id.
8. Tundidor, 831 F.3d at 1331.
9. Id. at 1331-32 (quoting Aqua Log, Inc. v. Lost & Abandoned Pre-Cut Logs & Rafts
of Logs, 709 F.3d 1055, 1059 (11th Cir. 2013)).
10. Id.
11. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1871).
12. Id. at 563.
13. A sign next to the structure states, "DANGER-NO BOATING BEYOND THIS
POINT."
14. Tundidor, 831 F.3d at 1330-31.
15. Id. at 1332.
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jurisdiction." 6 The appellant concluded his arguments in support of
subject matter jurisdiction by citing cases purportedly endorsing historic
navigability. The Eleventh Circuit noted that "these decisions do not
involve admiralty jurisdiction" and went through some length to
differentiate navigability for jurisdictional purposes from other scenarios
involving navigable waters or navigability.' 7 The twin touchstones of
uniformity and promotion of marine commerce underlie the historical
scope of navigability for jurisdictional purposes. In the absence of these
concerns, the court held that "extending jurisdiction to waters incapable
of commercial activity serves no purpose of admiralty jurisdiction."18
II. ARBITRATION OF SEAFARERS' CLAIMS

The decision in Suazo v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd.,19 is another in a line of
Eleventh Circuit decisions enforcing arbitration clauses in seafarers'
employment contracts. Willman Suazo, a Nicaraguan citizen, was
employed by Norwegian Cruise Lines (NCL) aboard the M/V
NORWEGIAN EPIC, a Bahamian-flagged vessel. Suazo was injured
while lifting heavy garbage bins as part of his duties aboard the vessel.
He eventually returned to his home country to seek medical care and
treatment which, at some point, NCL discontinued and declined to
reinstate. Suazo retained private counsel and filed suit against NCL in
the Miami-Dade County Circuit Court. NCL removed the case to federal
court and sought to compel arbitration as required by Suazo's
employment contract. 20
The NCL employment agreement dictated that all claims arising out
of shipboard employment would be resolved pursuant to the New York
Convention via arbitration in the seafarer's country of citizenship or, in
the alternative, in Nassau, Bahamas. The agreement was silent as to who
would bear the costs of arbitration, but reference was made to the
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between NCL and the Norwegian
Seafarers' Union (NSU). The CBA provided that the union would bear
the costs of arbitration for its member if a NSU legal representative

16. Id. (internal citations omitted).
17. Id. at 1332-34 (referencing, inter alia, congressional power under the Commerce
Clause, ownership of submerged lands, and navigational servitudes, etc.).
18. Id. at 1333.
19. 822 F.3d 543 (11th Cir. 2016).
20. Id. at 549. Suazo's employment contract fell within the reach of the "Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards." See Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Dec. 29, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 2517
[hereinafter The New York Convention]. See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (recognizing
The New York Convention and codifying its application and enforcement federally).
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represented the seafarer. However, if the seafarer rejected the NSU's
legal representative, the employee and NCL (employer) would each bear
one-half the costs of arbitration until the arbitrator determined the
issue. 21
Suazo opposed the foreign arbitration because of economic hardship.
He provided an affidavit stating that he was from a poor community in
Nicaragua where he could not find work and that he did not have money
to pay for arbitration. 22 The district court rejected this argument, finding
that a "public policy" defense of economic hardship was not available at
the arbitration-enforcement stage under the New York Convention.
Suazo appealed. 23
There are different defenses available under the New York Convention
(applicable to foreign arbitrations) versus the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA)24 (applicable to domestic arbitrations). When faced with a motion
to compel under the FAA, there is a "broad array of defenses to the
enforcement of arbitration agreements." 25 Specifically, the party
opposing a motion to compel domestic arbitration has all defenses
existing "at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 26 Courts
have interpreted the "effective vindication doctrine" as one defense
available in the context of domestic arbitration. 27 This is a public policy
consideration which assesses whether or not forcing a party into
arbitration would deprive that party of statutory claims otherwise
available in civil litigation. 28
In contrast, when a party seeks to enforce arbitration subject to the
New York Convention, available defenses to oppose such efforts are very
limited. Article II of the New York Convention provides that a court shall
enforce the arbitration provision, "unless it finds that the said agreement
is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed." 29
In the instant case, the appellate court faced an issue of first
impression: "We have never determined whether a cost-based effective
vindication defense can be raised under the 'incapable of being
performed' clause of Article II [of the New York Convention] . . . ."30 The
21. Suazo, 822 F.3d at 548-49.
22. Id. at 549-50.
23. Id. at 550.
24. U.S.C. tit. 9 (2018).
25. Suazo, 822 F.3d at 547.
26. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
27. Suazo, 822 F.3d at 547.
28. Id.
29. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art.
11(3) Dec. 29, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 2517.
30. Suazo, 822 F.3d at 553.
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court went on to state, however, that "we need not resolve that question
today because Suazo has fallen far short of establishing that enforcing
the arbitration agreement in this case will effectively deny him access to
the arbitral forum."31
The Eleventh Circuit did provide guidance for the next litigant to use
the cost-based effective vindication defense to oppose a motion to compel
arbitration subject to the New York Convention. Citing a fairly recent
case (which actually seemed to be directly on point), the court noted that
a party seeking to invoke an effective vindication doctrine based on the
expense of arbitration must present evidence of (1) the amount of fees he
or she is likely to incur and (2) an inability to pay those fees. 32 In the
instant case, the Eleventh Circuit held that Suazo failed to present
sufficient evidence of the amount of fees he would likely incur in the
putative arbitration.38 Moreover, the court also cited the fact that Suazo
could have received free representation from his union to pursue his
rights in the foreign arbitration. 34
In Alberts v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.,35 the plaintiff, a United
States citizen, was employed by Royal Caribbean as a trumpet player
aboard the M/V OASIS OF THE SEAS. The vessel sailed once a week
from Florida, calling on various foreign ports. 36 Alberts signed two
employment agreements, both of which contained arbitration clauses
requiring that all disputes "be referred to and resolved exclusively by
mandatory binding arbitration pursuant to the United Nations
Conventions [sic] on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards." 37
After becoming ill while working for Royal Caribbean, and based on
his belief that his employer failed to provide proper care, Alberts sued for
unseaworthiness, negligence, maintenance and cure, and other relief.
The district court granted Royal Caribbean's request to compel
arbitration.38
On appeal of the order compelling arbitration, the Eleventh Circuit
first observed that a district court is required by law to compel arbitration
if four jurisdictional prerequisites are met: (1) an agreement in writing;
(2) arbitration is in the territory of a signatory to the New York

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id. at 554.
Id.
Id. at 555.
834 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1203-04.
Id. at 1204.
Id.
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Convention; (3) the agreement must arise out of a commercial
relationship; and (4) the party to the agreement is either not an American
or the "relationship involves property located abroad, envisages
performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable
relation with one or more foreign states." 39 The issue at hand was
whether or not Alberts's performance as a musician aboard vessels in
international waters "envisages performance .

.

. abroad." 40

Alberts argued that "abroad" required his performance take place
within a foreign country and not merely in international waters.4 1 Royal
Caribbean argued that abroad meant anywhere outside of the country. 42
The Eleventh Circuit adopted an intermediate position, holding that
abroad meant "in or traveling to or from a foreign state." 43 Conversely,
performance in international waters on a voyage from a domestic port to
another domestic port would not be considered abroad." Here, however,
because Alberts's musical performances occurred during travel in
international waters to foreign ports, the arbitration clause was
enforceable. 45
III. CRUISE LINE PASSENGER CLAIMS

In Chang v. Carnival Corp.,46 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial
court's decision to dismiss a passenger's late-filed personal injury
lawsuit, declining to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling.4 7 The plaintiff
alleged that she slipped and fell on a Carnival cruise ship on December
9, 2012. Chang retained California counsel, who engaged in
communication with Carnival's claims personnel. On at least two
occasions, Carnival's claims personnel specifically told Chang's attorney
that Carnival would not waive any rights under the forum selection
clause in the passenger's cruise ticket. The ticket required any litigation
be pursued in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida, as long as there was subject matter jurisdiction to do so. Only
if federal subject matter jurisdiction was lacking could the plaintiff then

39.

Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 202).

40. Id.
41. Id.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id. at 1205.
Id.
Id.
839 F.3d 993 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 996.
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pursue claims in state court, and then the forum was contractually
specified to be the Circuit Court of Miami-Dade County, Florida.4 8
After switching to Florida counsel, the plaintiff filed a slip-and-fall
claim in a Florida state court on December 4 or 6, 2013.49 Carnival moved
to dismiss the state court action, asserting a violation of the ticket's
forum selection clause. Shortly thereafter, on March 4, 2014, and before
the state court action had been dismissed, the plaintiff filed the instant
suit in federal court. The federal lawsuit was filed almost three months
after the expiration of the one-year time bar in the passenger ticket.50
The district court dismissed the suit as untimely. 5 1 On appeal, the
plaintiff argued for an equitable tolling of the contractual limitation
52
found in her passenger ticket.
The Eleventh Circuit first noted that equitable tolling is an
extraordinary remedy to be applied only sparingly. 53 Four factors are
appropriately considered when assessing the application vel non of
equitable tolling when a suit was filed timely, albeit in the wrong forum:
(1) the state court possessed subject matter jurisdiction concurrently
with the federal court; (2) the state suit was dismissed solely on grounds
of improper venue; (3) the defendant was aware prior to the expiration
that the plaintiff intended to file suit; and (4) the plaintiff was entitled to
believe that the state court filing might be sufficient given the fact that
54
defendants often waive their defense of improper venue.
55
Booth v. CarnivalCorp. was a remarkably similar case. The plaintiff
therein filed suit in state court sixteen days before the expiration of the
limitations period. A later federal action in the proper forum was
initiated after the expiration of the contractual limitation period.56 The
district court in Booth, however, allowed the case to proceed, and the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the court's ruling by holding that equitable
tolling was appropriately applied.67
The clear distinction between Booth and Chang was Carnival's
unequivocal notice that it would insist on adherence to the forum

48. Id. at 994-95.
49. Id. at 995. The decision does not explain why there is an ambiguity in the filing
date, but either date would be before the contractual time limitation of one year from the
date of the injury.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 996.
54. Id. at 996-97.
55. 522 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2008).
56. Id. at 1149-50.
57. Id. at 1149-53.
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selection clause, followed by Chang's deliberate actions in ignoring the
admonition: 'Instead of complying with a provision of the contract that
Defendant had explicitly and timely brought to Plaintiffs attention,
Plaintiff instead chose to file her suit in the wrong forum. This was not
the conduct of the plaintiff in Booth."5 8
IV. THE LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT CLAIMS
In Miller v. Navalmar (UK) Ltd.,59 a longshoreman filed suit against a
vessel owner and time charterer claiming that the negligence of the
defendants precipitated his accident and injury while loading cargo
aboard the M/V CARRARA CASTLE.60 The United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia granted summary judgment in favor
of the defendants, rejecting the plaintiffs arguments that the vessel
interests: (1) maintained active control over the vessel and cargo loading
operations, or (2) failed to intervene and remediate a dangerous condition
after the stevedore (the injured longshoreman's employer) failed to do
SO.61

The plaintiffs claims against the vessel interests were governed by the
familiar trio of duties announced by Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De
Los Santos,62 and its progeny. Specifically, a vessel owner's duties to the
longshoremen working aboard its ship during cargo operations are fairly
narrow and well-defined by case law. These duties are generally referred
to as (1) the turnover duty; (2) the active control duty; and (3) the duty to
intervene. 63
In Miller, the plaintiff argued that both the active control duty and
duty to intervene were breached. With respect to the active control
argument, the plaintiff and his counsel employed a frequent tactic in
§ 905(b) litigation by relying on the vessel's internal procedures or
guidelines in an effort to impose duties vis-A-vis longshoremen working
aboard the ship.64 In this case, Grieg (the time charterer) had detailed

58. Chang, 839 F.3d at 997.
59. 685 F. App'x 751 (11th Cir. 2017).
60. Id. at 752. The plaintiff pursued his claims under 33 U.S.C. § 905(b), which permits
injured longshoremen to sue vessel interests for damages arising from "the negligence of a
vessel." 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (2018).
61. Miller, 685 F. App'x at 753-54.
62. 451 U.S. 156 (1981).
63. Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., 512 U.S. 92, 98 (1994) (naming the three primary
duties created by the Supreme Court in Scindia).
64. Miller, 685 F. App'x at 755-56.
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loading procedures in place. There was no evidence, however, that Grieg
actually required the stevedore to adhere to such procedures.6 5
Nevertheless, the plaintiff argued that the charterer was actively
involved in the cargo operations by virtue of the written procedures, as
well as a stow plan furnished to the stevedoring company and the
presence of Grieg's port captain aboard the vessel during loading
operations.66 The appellate court rejected these positions, noting that the
provision of a stow plan is common in the industry, and it is incumbent
upon the stevedore-an independent contractor hired for such
expertise-to carry it out.6 7 Likewise, the passive presence of supervisory
personnel during cargo operations is insufficient to create an active
involvement duty.65
With respect to the duty to intervene, it is implicated only upon
showing that the vessel owner has "actual knowledge of a dangerous
condition and actual knowledge that the stevedore, in the exercise of
'obviously improvident' judgment, has failed to remedy it."69 This is an
exceedingly narrow duty and is violated only by the most egregious of
circumstances. Here, the plaintiff attempted to show the stow plan
necessarily made the vessel interests aware of a dangerous condition (a
void in the corner of the stow). Assuming arguendo, that the defendants
had knowledge of the dangerous condition resulting from use of the plan,
the plaintiff still failed to show the vessel had actual knowledge of the
stevedore's failure to remedy the problem. 70 In fact, the stevedores loaded
the cargo before and after the accident and never brought any problem to
the attention of the vessel interests.71
Dixon v. NYK Reefers, Ltd. 72 is another suit arising from the death of
a longshoreman during stevedoring operations. 73 The focus was on the
vessel owner's purported duty to intervene in cargo operations.
Generally, the ship owner is not required to monitor or inject itself into
the work of a stevedore. However, a duty to intervene can be triggered if
the owner "becomes aware that the ship or its gear poses a danger to the
65. Id. at 756.
66. Id. at 755-56.

67. Id.
68. Id. There was no evidence that the port captain participated in the loading process.
Id. at 756-57.
69. Id. at 757 (quoting Greenwood v. Societe Fancaise De, 111 F.3d 1239, 1248 (5th
Cir. 1997)).
70. Id. at 757-58.
71. Id.
72. 705 F. App'x 819 (11th Cir. 2017).
73. Dixon was killed in the hold of the M/V WILD LOTUS when the crane operator
accidently landed a 5,500-pound tray on him. Id. at 821.
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longshoremen and that the stevedore is failing, unreasonably, to protect
the longshoreman." 74
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
granted summary judgment in favor of the vessel owner, holding that the
plaintiff failed to show that the defendants had a duty to intervene. 75
This appeal ensued. The plaintiff identified three specific examples of an
alleged unreasonably dangerous condition, of which the vessel should
have been aware. Specifically, the plaintiff cited to (1) the lack of a
"header," the stevedore employee who was supposed to oversee the hatch
to make sure the landing area is clear; (2) the lack of a "lander," another
stevedore employee who clears the deck and communicates with the
crane operator; and (3) the lack of radio communication between the
longshoremen and crane operator.7 6 It was undisputed that there were
no defects with the vessel or its appurtenant equipment. 77
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit pointed out that there was no
evidence the vessel was aware of any of the foregoing problems, and
rejected out of hand that the mere presence of the ship's crew in the area
was sufficient to impart constructive knowledge of a possible hazard.7 8
Further, even if the plaintiff had demonstrated actual knowledge of a
potentially unreasonably hazardous condition, the plaintiff failed to show
that the ship, its officers, or its crew knew of the stevedore's failure to
remedy the problem.7 9 The court pointed out that neither the stevedore
nor any of its employees or longshoremen ever complained to the vessel
interests about unsafe conditions before or during cargo operations.8 0
This holding is consistent with the general proposition that a vessel
owner, operator, or charterer is entitled to rely on a stevedore to perform
its tasks without supervision. The presence of crewmembers aboard a
ship-even if on deck to observe cargo operations-does not translate into
a supervisory obligation or duty.8 1 Similarly, the fact that the vessel
owner, operator, or charterer may have internal documents which
address loading operations (such as a stow plan or pre-cargo operation
checklist) does not create a duty outside of the narrow confines of Scindia

74. Id.
Cir. 1986)).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.

at 822 (quoting Clark v. Bothelho Shipping Corp., 784 F.2d 1563, 1565 (11th
at 821.
at 822-23.
at 823.
at 823-24.
at 824.
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and its progeny. 82 The plaintiff made such an argument almost as an
afterthought, citing to the captain's testimony about a pre-cargo
operation checklist.83 Courts appear to uniformly reject this idea,
refusing to expand the parameters of Scindia and its progeny.8 4
In Seaboard Spirit, Ltd. v. Hyman,85 a longshoreman was killed during
the course of cargo operations. The vessel involved was the SEABOARD
SPIRIT, a "roll-on/roll-off' vessel.86 At the load port, a third-party
stevedore brought the cargo of wheeled containers aboard the vessel.
Once aboard the ship, however, the SEABOARD SPIRITs crew secured
the containers. 87 While unloading the cargo at the Port of Miami, Hyman
stepped into a pinch point next to a container still aboard the ship. The
container's chassis shifted and Hyman was crushed against the vessel's

bulkhead.88
The vessel owner filed a limitation action seeking exoneration from, or
limitation of, liability arising out of Hyman's death.8 9 The personal
representative of Hyman's estate filed claims in the limitation action,
arguing against exoneration and asserting claims under 33 U.S.C.
§§ 905(b)90 and 93391 of the Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act. 92
After a three-day bench trial, the District Court for the Southern
District of Florida entered judgment in favor of the vessel owner and
against the claimants on the § 905(b) claim. 93 The court left open the
possibility that the claimants could pursue a separate negligence action
against Seaboard (vessel owner) arising from its actions as the loading

82. Id. at 825.
83. Id. at 825-26.
84. See, e.g., Horton v. Maersk Line, Ltd., 603 F. App'x 791 (11th Cir. 2015) (rejecting
the plaintiffs position that the vessel's Safety Management System Manual required the
vessel's officers to supervise and insure safe cargo operations).
85. 672 F. App'x 935 (11th Cir. 2016).
86. Id. at 936.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 937.
89. Id.
90. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (2018) (providing that longshoremen or their representatives
may bring suit for damages caused by the "negligence of a vessel').
91. 33 U.S.C. § 933 (2018) (providing, inter alia, that injured workers or their
representatives need not elect between receipt of compensation under The Longshore and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act and pursuing a third-party claim).
92. Seaboard Spirit, 672 F. App'x at 937.
93. Id. at 937-38.
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stevedore; recall the ship's crew secured the container trailers after they
were brought aboard the SEABOARD SPIRIT.94
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred by
allowing the decedent's family an opening to pursue a subsequent action
against the vessel owner in its role as stevedore. 95 By its terms, § 905(b)
provides the exclusive means of relief against vessel interests for
negligence claims advanced by longshoremen.9 6 This is the case even if
97
the vessel's crew provided stevedoring services during cargo operations.
When this factual situation occurs, the injured longshoreman pursues a
claim under § 905(b), but the vessel owner is held to a heightened
standard of care; that is, the heightened standard applicable to a
stevedore versus the fairly narrow duties generally imposed on a vessel
owner by Scindia and its progeny.98
Evidently, the appellants failed to argue that the district court should
be reversed for applying the wrong standard of care. Finding that the
claimants abandoned this argument, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
judgment for the vessel owner.99
V. MARINE REPAIR CONTRACTS
100
the
In Mount Sage, Ltd. v. Rolls-Royce Commercial Marine, Inc.,
are
clauses
Eleventh Circuit reiterated that limitation-of-liability
the
of
owner
the
was
enforceable in marine repair contracts. The plaintiff
propulsion
MI Y DOLCE VITA II, a yacht equipped with a water jet
system. The vessel owner contracted with Rolls-Royce Commercial
Marine, Inc. (Rolls-Royce) to purchase parts, perform service, and
complete an overhaul of the vessel's water jets. 101 The work was never
completed to the owner's satisfaction, and he continued to complain of
vibrations and deterioration in the vessel's equipment. The cause was
eventually discovered to be misalignment between the engines and water
jets. 102 The plaintiff filed suit against the repair shop asserting claims for

94. Id. at 938.
95. Id. at 941.
96. Id. at 940-41. Section 905(b) states, in pertinent part: "The remedy provided in this
subsection shall be exclusive of all other remedies against the vessel except remedies
available under this Act." 33 U.S.C. § 905(b).
97. Seaboard Spirit, 672 F. App'x at 940-41.
98. Id. at 939.
99. Id. at 941.
100. 635 F. App'x 833 (11th Cir. 2016).
101. Id. at 834-35.
102. Id. at 835.

2018]

ADMIRALTY

1013

breach of express and implied warranties, as well as claiming a violation
of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.1 03
Following a jury trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of
the vessel owner, but reduced the damages awarded pursuant to the
contractual limitation-of-liability clause. Both parties were unhappy
with the result, and this appeal followed. 104
The Eleventh Circuit applied the three-part test set out in Diesel
"Repower,"Inc. v. IslanderInvestments, Ltd.,o105 to determine whether the
limitation of liability clause was enforceable. The clause must:
(1) demonstrate clear and unequivocal indication of the parties'
intentions; (2) not work to totally absolve the repair shop of all liability
but still provide an effective deterrent to negligence; and (3) show that
the contracting parties possessed relatively equal bargaining power so as
to avoid any overreaching.10 6 Determining that there was no evidence of
unconscionability or overreaching, and the other prerequisites having
been met, the appellate court affirmed the enforcement of the repairer's
contractual limitation clause. 107 This limited the vessel owner's relief to
(1) the necessary labor and replacement parts to complete warranty
repairs and (2) monetary damages capped at 20% of the purchase order
price. 108
VI. MARINE INSURANCE

A. All-Risk Policies
In Great Lakes Reinsurance (UK) PLC v. Kan-Do, Inc.,109 a marine
insurer filed a declaratory judgment action in an attempt to avoid paying
a claim following the sinking of its insured's yacht (the M/ Y KAN-DO).
Great Lakes argued that its "all-risk" marine insurance policy should not
apply to the sinking of the vessel because (1) the loss was not "accidental
or fortuitous," and (2) an exclusion otherwise barred coverage. 110 Finding
103. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (2018). The appellate court agreed with the trial court that
Magnuson-Moss Act claims were inapplicable to the instant repair transaction. Mount
Sage, 635 F. App'x at 838.
104. Mount Sage, 635 F. App'x at 836. The limitation clause excluded "indirect,
consequential, special, or incidental damages of any kind" and capped the repairer's
monetary liability to "twenty percent (20%) of that total price of the purchase order that
gives rise to the claim." Id. at 835.
105. 271 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2001).
106. Mount Sage, 635 F. App'x at 836-37.
107. Id. at 837.
108. Id.
109. 639 F. App'x 599 (11th Cir. 2016).
110. Id. at 600.
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that the cited exclusionary language was ambiguous, the District Court
for the Middle District of Florida entered judgment in favor of the vessel
owner. This appeal followed."'1
On November 5, 2012, the M/ Y KAN-DO sank in its slip due to water
intrusion. It was determined that the bilge pump failed, allowing the boat
to take on water and sink. The bilge pump failed because of a blown fuse.
The cause of the blown fuse was never determined. It was agreed,
however, that the cause of the loss was not due to excessive wear and
112
tear or lack of maintenance.
An all-risk policy is what the name implies: an insurance policy to
"cover all 'fortuitous' losses, 'unless the policy contains a specific
provision expressly excluding the loss from coverage."' 113 To recover
under an all-risk policy, the insured must show that a loss occurred
because of a fortuitous event. 114 This burden is light, as the purpose of an
all-risk policy is to protect the insured "in those cases where difficulties
of logical explanation or some mystery surround the (loss of or damage
to) property." 115 Thus, the insured is not obligated to prove the precise
cause of loss or damage. 116 The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district
court that the vessel owner met its initial burden of establishing a
fortuitous loss.

1 17

This shifted the burden of proof to Great Lakes to

demonstrate that the otherwise covered loss was excluded by some policy
language. 118
Great Lakes argued the policy excluded damage to the vessel's engines
and its mechanical and electrical parts, "unless caused by an accidental
external event, such as collision, impact with a fixed or floating object,
grounding, stranding, ingestion of a foreign object, lightning strike or
fire." 119 The district court concluded that the referenced exclusion, when
read in conjunction with the scope of coverage in another part of the
policy, created ambiguity. 120 Thus, it was appropriate to construe the

111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 601 (quoting Dow Chem. Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 635 F.2d 379, 386 (5th Cir.
1981)).
114. Id.
115. Id. (quoting Morrison Grain Co. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 632 F.2d 424, 430 (5th Cir.
1980)).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 602.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 603. For clarity, it is worth quoting the trial court's reasoning:
Here, the district court concluded that Exclusion r created ambiguity in the
policy because, giving the ordinary meaning to the operative terms in both

2018]

ADMIRALTY

1015

contact against Great Lakes and in favor of extending coverage to the
insured. 121
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, and held that the district court erred
in finding an ambiguity based on the fact that the same terms appeared
in both a coverage section and an exclusionary clause. 122 It is, as the
appellate court pointed out, the "very nature of an insurance contract"
that "exclusions in coverage are expressly intended to modify coverage
clauses and to limit their scope." 123 The appellate court remanded the
case for further factual development, pointing out that the scope of the
cited exclusion (vessel's engines and its mechanical and electrical parts),
124
was narrower than the extent of the policy's coverage (the vessel itself).

B. Bad Faith Claims
Atlantic Specialty & Co. v. Mr. CharlieAdventures, LLC,1 25 is a marine
insurance case involving a fire aboard the M/Y MR. CHARLIE. The
vessel was insured by Atlantic Specialty & Co. (Atlantic) which, after
investigating the claim, denied coverage. Atlantic also filed the instant
declaratory judgment action, which prompted the insured to pursue a
counterclaim for bad faith and breach of contract. 126 After striking the
expert reports tendered by the insurance company, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Alabama granted judgment in
favor of the vessel owner, finding coverage existed for the loss. 127 In doing
so, the court rejected a theory advanced by the insurance companysupported by its now discredited experts-that marine growth on the
starboard intake screen restricted the flow of seawater needed to cool the
engine, thus causing it to overheat. 128 Despite striking the expert reports,
the district court found that the reports did provide the insurance
company with an arguable basis to deny the claim. 129 Summary judgment
Coverage A and Exclusion r-such as "mechanical parts," "machinery," and
"equipment"-"many of the same parts of the Kan-Do could reasonably fall
under either Coverage 'A' or Exclusion 'r,' thus creating ambiguity."
Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. (quoting Ajax Bldg. Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 358 F.3d 795, 798-99 (11th
Cir. 2004)).
124. Id. at 604.
125. 644 F. App'x 922 (11th Cir. 2016).
126. Id. at 923.
127. Id. at 925.
128. Id.
129. Id. (holding that plaintiff offered "no evidence showing that, at the time it denied
his claim, Atlantic knew or had reason to know that the expert reports were unreliable").
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was granted in favor of the insurance company on the insured's bad faith
claims.130
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed. The case is governed by
Alabama law and the decision provides an overview of the state's
jurisprudence on alleged bad faith failure to investigate and pay firstparty property claims. The question is whether the carrier had an
arguable reason to deny the claim in the first instance. 13 1 Running
through a litany of obvious errors with the expert reports, the Eleventh
Circuit held that the plaintiff had "proffered sufficient evidence to create
a triable issue as to whether Atlantic had an arguable reason to deny his
claim."1 32 The case was remanded back to the trial court for further
proceedings.1 33
The decision presents a cautionary tale with respect to insurance
claims and reliance on experts to make coverage determinations. The
mistakes made by the two experts involved were discussed in some detail
by the appellate court. 134 Closer scrutiny might have prompted additional
investigation, or a decision to simply pay the claim in the first instance.
VII.MARITIME LIENS AND ATTACHMENT PROCEEDINGS

The Eleventh Circuit weighed in on the O.W. Bunker bankruptcy
proceedings, and the ensuing chaotic fallout therefrom, in the decision
Barcliff, LLC u. M/V DEEP BLUE.13 The dispositive question, as in
almost all of the related litigation, turns on who is entitled to a lien for
bunker fuel supplied to a vessel. 136 Is it the physical supplier, which
actually delivered the product and remains unpaid? Or, as more often
than not, is it a distant creditor that took a security interest in accounts
receivable from the now defunct parent company (O.W. Bunker Group)?
The M/V DEEP BLUE is a pipe-laying vessel owned by Technip UK
Ltd. To obtain bunkers (marine fuel) for the M/VDEEP BLUE, Technip
requested bids from various fuel suppliers. The low bid came from O.W.
Bunkers UK Ltd. (O.W. UK). O.W. UK did not physically supply the fuel

130. Id. The insured alleged that the insurance company intentionally (1) failed to
properly investigate the claim and (2) failed to pay the claim in the absence of any
reasonable or arguable basis for such refusal. Id. at 925-26 (discussing Alabama law, which
governed the bad-faith claims).
131. Id. at 925-27.
132. Id. at 927.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 924-25.
135. 876 F.3d 1063 (11th Cir. 2017).

136. See, e.g., Clearlake Shipping PTE, Ltd. v. O.W. Bunker (Switzerland) SA, 239 F.
Supp. 3d 674 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
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to the vessel. Instead, it contracted with its U.S. counterpart, O.W.
Bunker USA, Inc. (O.W. USA) to take up this task. In turn, O.W. USA
contracted with Barcliff, LLC d/b/a RadclifflEconomy Marine Services
(Radcliff) to actually deliver bunkers to the M/VDEEPBLUE in Mobile,
Alabama. Invoicing for the sale worked in reverse, Radcliff billed O.W.
USA, which billed O.W. UK, which then billed Technip for the fuel
supplied to the M/V DEEP BLUE.13 7
Radcliff delivered bunkers to the ship on November 1, 2014. Less than
a week later, on November 7, 2014, the O.W. entities' parent company
(O.W. Bunker Group) filed bankruptcy in Denmark.13 8 The fallout was
widespread and immediate, with the American entity (O.W. USA) filing
bankruptcy in Connecticut on November 13, 2014.139 Radcliff was left
holding the proverbial bag, in this case, an unpaid invoice in the amount
of $699,550.140
Filing suit in the District Court for the Southern District of Alabama
and asserting a maritime lien against the M/V DEEP BLUE, Radcliff
demanded payment for the necessaries delivered to the vessel. 141 Joining
the fray at this point was ING Bank, N.V. (ING). ING had entered into a
credit agreement to loan money to the O.W. Bunker Group, and the credit
was secured by O.W. Bunker Group's receivables due from various and
sundry customers around the world. 142 In the district court, ING opposed
Radcliff's assertion of a maritime lien, claiming that ING actually
possessed a lien on the M/VDEEP BLUE. Specifically, ING alleged that
O.W. UK supplied bunkers to the M/V DEEP BLUE through
subcontractors. Technip had not yet paid O.W. UK, so O.W. UK held the
lien on the vessel pending payment. 143 Coupled with ING's security
interest in the accounts receivable, ING claimed that it, not Radcliff, was
entitled to be paid for the bunkers supplied to the M/V DEEP BLUE.
Technip, understandably, just wanted to pay once for the fuel, so it
44
deposited the balance due ($705,529.50) into the registry of the court.1
Following a bench trial, the district court determined that Radcliff was
not entitled to a lien under the Federal Maritime Lien Act. 145 Further,

137. Barcliff, 876 F.3d at 1065-66.
138. Id. at 1066.
139. Id. at 1066-67.
140. Id. at 1066.
141. Id. at 1067.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 46 U.S.C. § 31342 (2018) (now codified under the heading "Commercial
Instruments and Maritime Liens"). The Federal Maritime Lien Act requires a claimant
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the district court found that ING, by virtue of its standing in the shoes of
the "supplier" and having received assignment of accounts receivable
from O.W. Bunker Group, was entitled to the lien and receipt of the funds
in the court's registry. 146 Understandably upset by the fact that it was
not paid for the fuel it sold, Radcliff appealed.147
The decision about Radcliffs standing to assert a maritime lien is
actually fairly straightforward under Eleventh Circuit precedent.
Although Radcliff physically supplied the fuel to the M/V DEEP BLUE,
it did so only at the end of a buy-and-sell chain strung together by various
subcontractors working between the vessel owner and the end result (for
example, Radcliff's physical supplying of fuel). The Eleventh Circuit
surmised the law in this regard as follows: "[w]here the owner directs a
general contractor to provide necessaries to its vessel, a subcontractor
retained by the general contractor to perform the work or provide the
supplies is generally not entitled to a maritime lien." 148 Under the
general rule, therefore, Radcliff did not have a maritime lien on the M/ V

DEEP BL UE. 149
Turning to the status of ING as proper lien holder having received
assignment rights pursuant to its credit agreement with the O.W.
Bunker Group, the Eleventh Circuit again affirmed the decision of the
trial court awarding payment to ING. First, it was clear that O.W. UK
obtained a lien on the M/VDEEPBLUE because it "provided" fuel to the
vessel within the meaning of the Federal Maritime Lien Act. 15 0 This
analysis comports with basic contractual principles, inasmuch as a party
can delegate performance that, once this occurs, satisfies the principal's
obligations.151 Indeed, this issue seems to have already been decided by
Galehead, Inc. v. M/V ANGLIA,152 which was cited and relied upon in
Barcliff as controlling precedent.153
Likewise, the assignment question was easily disposed of. A review of
the security agreement between ING and the debtor reflected an intent
asserting a maritime lien to demonstrate that it supplied "necessaries to a vessel on the
order of the owner or a person authorized by the owner." 46 U.S.C. § 31342(a) (2018).
146. Barcliff, 876 F.3d at 1067.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1071. Absent facts indicating the owner designated the general contractor to
act as its agent and procure necessaries on its behalf, a general contractor does not have
the authority to bind the ship or its owner. Id. In the instant case, the parties stipulated
that none of the O.W. entities were Technip's agents. Id. at 1068.
149. Id. at 1071.
150. Id. at 1073--74.
151. Id.
152. Galehead, Inc. v. M/V ANGLIA, 183 F.3d 1242, 1245 (11th Cir. 1999).
153. Barcliff, 876 F.3d at 1073-74.
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to include all monetary sums owed for "supply receivables," such as the
money owed by Technip for delivery of fuel. 154 It was reasonable, when
viewed in the proper context, that any security for the debt (like a
maritime lien) would follow this assignment as well.155 Accordingly, the
Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's determination that O.W. UK
had a lien on the vessel, such right had been properly assigned to ING,
and that ING was entitled to collect the money from Technip.156

The plaintiffs in SCL Basilisk AG v. Agribusiness United Savannah

Logistics, LLC15 7 attempted to attach the defendants' assets to obtain
security in aide of London arbitration.15 The defendants were the voyage
charterers of the M/V SCL BASILISK. The vessel was detained by a
non-party on an unrelated claim, pursuant to a writ of attachment in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. 5 9
Charterers delayed posting security to release the vessel and, as a result,
the plaintiffs incurred significant damages. London arbitration was
initiated according to the terms of the voyage charter agreement.16 0
After commencing the London arbitration, the plaintiffs filed a
petition in the District Court for the Southern District of Georgia to
obtain security in aide of foreign arbitration. The plaintiffs' petition
sought relief through both Rule B "attachment,"1 6 1 as well as a recently
enacted Georgia statute allowing a party to seek "an interim measure of
protection, and a court may grant such measure, and such request shall
62
not be deemed to be incompatible with an arbitration agreement."1
The district court held an expedited hearing, but denied the requested
relief, determining that the Rule B attachment was unavailable since all
of the listed defendants were present within the district.163 Turning to
Georgia law, the district court found that it could not apply a state
statute that would frustrate the uniformity of maritime law: "[A]llowing

154. Id. at 1074-75.
155. Id. at 1075.
156. Id. The inequities of this result are readily apparent (to the Author, at least), but
the Eleventh Circuit was not ready to lend Radcliff a shoulder to cry on: "[B]y entering into
a contractual relationship exclusively with O.W. USA, Radcliff became O.W. USA's creditor.
It is assuredly not the only one .... It was Radcliff's right to gamble, but its choice should
elicit no sympathy." Id. at 1073 n.15.
157. 875 F.3d 609 (11th Cir. 2017).
158. Id. at 612.
159. Id. A letter of indemnity requiring charterers to post security if the vessel was
arrested or detained was issued along with the executed voyage charter party. Id.
160. Id.
161. FED. R. Civ. P. supp. B.
162. O.C.G.A. § 9-9-30 (2018).
163. SCL Basilisk, 875 F.3d at 612-13.
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plaintiffs to seek attachment outside of the rules would not only subject
entities to varying security and attachment requirements, it would also
allow them to bypass the procedural requirements of the Supplemental
Rules."1 64
The Eleventh Circuit made short work of the Rule B argument. Rule
B has the twin purposes of securing jurisdiction over an absent defendant
(one not found within the district), as well as providing security in the
event of a future award. 165 Because the defendants were admittedly
within the Southern District of Georgia, attachment under Rule B was
not permissible: "The two purposes may not be separated, however, for
security cannot be obtained except as an adjunct to obtaining
jurisdiction." 166
The Eleventh Circuit then turned to the analysis under Georgia law,
specifically Official Code of Georgia Annotated section 9-9-30.167 This is
a section within Georgia's recently enacted International Commercial
Arbitration Code.16 8 Again, the referenced provision allows a litigant to
petition a court for "an interim measure of protection," before or during
arbitral proceedings.169 Essentially, the Eleventh Circuit cast § 9-9-30 as
an "enabling statute," devoid of any substantive remedial power. It was
incumbent on the litigant seeking relief to identify and employ
substantive remedies (such as attachment) if available pursuant to a
specific state law. 170 Here, it was acknowledged that Georgia did provide
relief in the form of attachment and garnishment. The plaintiffs at the
trial court level never cited or pursued such remedies; instead, they
apparently sought only "an order requiring the posting of security
pursuant to Georgia Code. . . § 9-9-30."171

164. Id. at 614. Of course, Rule 64 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contemplates
that state law remedies are available to litigants in federal court. FED. R. Civ. P. 64. Rule
64(b) lists specific examples which include arrest, attachment, and garnishment. FED. R.
Civ. P. 64(b). The Eleventh Circuit noted that some of these are specifically available under
Georgia law such as attachment and garnishment. See O.C.G.A. tit. 18 chs. 3, 4.
165. SCL Basilisk, 875 F.3d at 615.
166. Id. (quoting Seawind Compania, S.A. v. Crescent Line, Inc., 320 F.2d 580, 582 (2d
Cir. 1963)).
167. O.C.G.A. § 9-9-30.
168. O.C.G.A. tit. 9 ch. 9 art. 1 pt. 2. Georgia's statute is based on the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law's Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration (UNCITRAL Model Law). See SCL Basilisk AG, 875 F.3d at 616.
169. O.C.G.A. § 9-9-30.
170. SCL Basilisk, 875 F.3d at 618-19. The Eleventh Circuit determined such reading
of O.C.G.A. § 9-9-30 was consistent with the commentaries to the UNCITRAL Model Law,
upon which the Georgia statute was based. See id. at 617.
171. SCL Basilisk, 875 F.3d at 616.
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A last-ditch effort by appellants relied on the equitable powers of an
admiralty court to fashion relief appropriate for the circumstances
presented. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this approach and its
concomitant reliance upon SchiffahartsgesellschaftLeonhardt & Co. v. A.
Bottacchi S.A. de Navegacion.172 There is language in Leonhardt
suggesting that a district court, sitting in admiralty, may tailor
appropriate prejudgment remedies pursuant to its equitable power. 173
The Eleventh Circuit refused to take an expansive view of this practice
in light of congressional authority to alter historical powers of an
admiralty court, which had been done with the enactment of the
Supplemental Rules. 174 "[D]istrict courts still may apply and adapt their
inherent admiralty powers as long as they do so consistently with the
Supplemental Rules."175 Because of the limiting dictates of Supplemental
Rule B (that is, it cannot separate jurisdiction from security), any
exercise of the court's equitable power to order attachment solely for
security would be prohibited. 176
In the Author's humble opinion, this is a particularly harsh result
given the unique vagaries of maritime actors and the likely inability to
find assets with which to satisfy any award rendered in arbitration. In
fact, this was the starting point for the Eleventh Circuit's discussion and
analysis.177 It seems the district court, followed by the appellate court,
went to lengths to exalt form over function; that is, failure to cite specific
state law statutes providing the substantive relief requested, even
though it was clear from the pleadings what relief was being sought.
Again, Rule B incorporates by reference Rule 64 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 178 which allows litigants to use state law remedies
"however designated." There is no requirement for talismanic words or
magic language which, in years gone by, would often catch unwary
litigants off guard. From the Author's view, the result in this case is an
impermissible return to such rigid doctrine.

172. 773 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane).
173. Id. at 1533.
174. SCL Basiliksk, 875 F.3d at 621.
175. Id. at 622.
176. Id.
177. See id. at 614 ("Maritime parties are peripatetic, and their assets are often
transitory.") (internal quotations omitted).
178. FED. R. Civ. P. 64.
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VIII.MARITIME DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT

This Article summarizes three criminal decisions, all addressing
matters within the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA).1 79
80
where the defendant pled guilty
The first is United States v. Iguaran,1
to conspiracy to distribute cocaine while aboard a vessel subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States. 181 On appeal, Iguaran argued that the
District Court for the Southern District of Florida lacked subject matter
jurisdiction because the record failed to establish that the vessel upon
which he was apprehended was, in fact, "subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States." 182
Thus, the threshold inquiry-but not an element of the underlying
offensel83-is that the district court have jurisdiction over the vessel
involved: "[T]he Government must preliminarily show that the
conspiracy's vessel was, when apprehended, 'subject to the jurisdiction of
84
the United States."'1
In the case at hand, the district court did not make any factual findings
with respect to jurisdiction. 185 The defendant's plea agreement simply
stipulated to the fact that he was aboard a vessel that was subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States. 186 The Eleventh Circuit pointed out that
parties may not stipulate to jurisdiction, although they may stipulate to
facts that otherwise establish the federal court's jurisdiction.1 8 7 In this
case, the plea agreement was devoid of such predicate facts. The court
remanded the matter to the district court "for the limited purpose of
determining whether subject matter jurisdiction exists" and to assess
whether the government had met its burden of establishing the vessel
involved was indeed subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.1 88
The case may be important to those practicing criminal law in the
maritime realm. The threshold inquiry in any federal proceeding is
subject matter jurisdiction. Whether a civil or criminal action, the parties

179. U.S.C. tit. 46 ch. 705 (2018).
180. 821 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2016).
181. 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(1) (2018).
182. 46 U.S.C. § 70502(c)(1) (2018). The MDLEA lists multiple examples of when a
vessel would be "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States," including a vessel without
nationality or a vessel flagged by a country which has given consent to U.S. law enforcement
activities. See 46 U.S.C. § 70502(c)(1)(A), (C) (2018).
183. 46 U.S.C. § 70504(a) (2018).
184. Iguaran, 821 F.3d at 1336 (quoting United States v. De La Garza, 516 F.3d 1266,
1272 (11th Cir. 2008)).
185. Id. at 1337.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1338.
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cannot stipulate to the same. Subject matter jurisdiction either exists for
the federal court or it does not.
In United States v. Wilchcombe,189 the United States Coast Guard
intercepted a small vessel traveling between Haiti and the Bahamas.
During the chase, multiple bales of cocaine and marijuana were thrown
overboard. The small boat eventually stopped, and the men aboard taken
into custody. 19 0 The vessel was registered in the Bahamas, so the Coast
Guard requested that the Bahamian government provide a statement of
no objection (SNO) which would allow Coast Guard personnel to board
the subject vessel for law enforcement reasons. 191 The Bahamian
government confirmed that the vessel was registered in the Bahamas
and provided the SNO.19 2 The occupants of the subject vessel eventually
pled guilty or were convicted for various and sundry crimes, including
charges under the MDLEA for conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute drugs while aboard a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States.193
There were several issues raised on appeal. Germane for present
purposes, however, is the argument that the federal government failed to
establish jurisdiction over the vessel because the SNO obtained from the
Bahamian government was invalid. 194 Under the MDLEA, a foreign
nation can consent or waive its objection to law enforcement activity of
the United States by verbal confirmation received over radio, telephone,
or similar electronic means.1 95 The defendants here argued the language
in the SNO received from the Bahamian government failed to precisely
follow the language contained in the MDLEA.196 The Eleventh Circuit
has previously approved SNOs that did not mirror exactly the language
of the MDLEA: "[W]e reiterate that, as long as the substance of the
consent or waiver is communicated, the language contained in SNOs
need not exactly track the language contained in § 70502(c)(1)(C) to
satisfy the requirements of the MDLEA." 97
The last in the trio of MDLEA cases is United States v. Cruickshank.198
The defendant was aboard the vessel VENUS, located in international

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

838 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1184.
Id. at 1184-85.
Id.
Id. at 1185.
Id. at 1186.
46 U.S.C. § 70502(c)(2)(A) (2018).
Wilchcombe, 838 F.3d at 1186.
Id. at 1187.
837 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2016).
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waters, and carrying 171 kilograms of cocaine when the ship was
intercepted by the United States Coast Guard. Cruickshank was
convicted and sentenced to a lengthy prison term for conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute drugs while aboard a vessel subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States. 199 Challenging the federal court's
jurisdiction as well as the constitutionality of the MDLEA, Cruickshank
appealed. 200
Unsurprisingly, the Eleventh Circuit rejected both arguments. This
case is interesting for its brief background discussion of the congressional
authority to enact the MDLEA pursuant to the "Felonies Clause," 201
which authorizes the federal government to define and punish felonies
committed on the high seas. 202 The court further noted that the criminal
act does not need a nexus to the United States in order to come within
the purview of the MDLEA, "because the Felonies Clause empowers
Congress to punish crimes committed on the high seas, and because 'the
trafficking of narcotics is condemned universally by law-abiding
203
nations.'

IX. SALVAGE
Salvage cases are always interesting from a factual and historical
standpoint. The opinions often include tales of lost gold and ships
floundering in hurricanes and treacherous weather, all leading to the
present-day legal fight over who is entitled to the recovered treasure. The

decision in Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 204
presents a good overview of this unique field within admiralty law.
Salvors, Inc. was the successor-in-interest to Cobb Coin Company (Cobb).
In 1979, Cobb pulled a single cannon from a field of debris off the coast
of south Florida, near Vero Beach. The wreckage was believed to come
from the remains of the "Almiranta of the New Spain Group of the 1715
Plate Fleet, known to the Spanish by two names: San Christo del Valle
and Nuestra Senora de la Concepcion." 205 Cobb filed suit in the District
Court for the Southern District of Florida, using the cannon to establish
in rem jurisdiction. 206 Cobb requested an order granting it exclusive
rights to salvage the shipwreck. Eventually, after addressing claims by
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. at 1186-87.
Id. at 1187.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10.
Cruickshank, 837 F.3d at 1188.
Id. (quoting Campbell, 743 F.3d at 810).
861 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1283.
Id.
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the State of Florida to the wreck, the court entered an order in 1982
granting Cobb exclusive rights to proceed with salvage operations,
subject to the requirement that it appear yearly for a distribution
hearing. Cobb and its successors-in-interest did so for the following three
decades. 207
In 2010, 1715 Fleet-Queens Jewels, LLC (1715 Fleet), a
successor-in-interest to Cobb, engaged subcontractors to assist with the
salvage operations. 208 One of the subcontractors was Gold Hound, LLC
(Gold Hound). Gold Hound eventually developed and used proprietary
software and maps to assist in this endeavor. In 2013, 1715 Fleet
attempted to renegotiate the contract with Gold Hound, requiring that
Gold Hound surrender ownership of its intellectual property (proprietary
maps and computer software). When the parties could not come to terms,
Gold Hound was no longer allowed to work on the wreck site. 209
Before the 2014 distribution hearing, Gold Hound filed a motion to
intervene in order to protect its interests and recover certain property
allegedly discovered using the proprietary materials. 210 The court denied
the motion to intervene, finding it to be untimely. At the 2015
distribution hearing, Gold Hound filed a claim asserting a maritime lien
over certain artifacts. 211 The district court concluded that Gold Hound
was not entitled to recover under its lien claim, and Gold Hound
appealed. 212
The first argument advanced by Gold Hound on appeal was that the
district court lacked in rem jurisdiction. This was quickly disposed of by
the appellate court, reiterating the understanding that in rem
jurisdiction can be actual or constructive. 213 The trial court obtained
constructive in rem jurisdiction over the entirety of the shipwreck by
virtue of the cannon used as the in rem lynchpin in 1979, and jurisdiction
continued to remain valid for the ensuing decades. 214 The substantive
arguments on appeal were, essentially, that the district court erred in
denying Gold Hounds' motion to intervene in the 2014 distribution
207. Id. at 1283-84.
208. Id. at 1284.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1285.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1286-87.
214. Id. at 1289. There was a second jurisdictional argument arising out of the
Abandoned Shipwreck Act, U.S.C. tit. 43 ch. 39 (2018). This Act was enacted in 1988,
several years after the district court exercised its exclusive admiralty jurisdiction over the
rest brought before the court by Cobb. The Abandoned Shipwreck Act has a specific section
precluding retroactive application. 43 U.S.C. § 2106(c) (2018).
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hearing, as well as denying the maritime lien filed by Gold Hound in the
2015 distribution hearing. 215
The Eleventh Circuit provided a comprehensive overview of standing
necessary for intervention, finding that Gold Hound easily met the
threshold inquiry (that is, an injury-in-fact, a connection between
claimed injury and the defendant's conduct, and a likelihood that a
favorable decision would redress the injury). 216 Recall that the decision
for the 2014 distribution hearing turned on the alleged untimeliness of
Gold Hound's motion to intervene. There was no significant delay
between the order setting the date of the 2014 distribution hearing and
Gold Hound's motion to intervene. The appellate court determined there
was no suggestion or showing of prejudice to the interested parts, but
that Gold Hound was undoubtedly prejudiced since it was not allowed to
participate. 217 Gold Hound fully satisfied the requirements for
intervention under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 218 as
well as the local admiralty rules. The Eleventh Circuit held that the trial
court erred by denying Gold Hound's motion to intervene in the 2014
distribution hearing. 219
Turning to the 2015 distribution hearing, the appellate court held that
Gold Hound may have a maritime lien associated with the salvage of
treasure subject to distribution during that proceeding. 220 Maritime liens
arise from salvage services, although a claimant need not actually
salvage the property. 221 "[A]11 who engaged in the [salvage] enterprise
and materially contributed to the saving of the property, are entitled to
share in the reward. . . ."222 Since the district court denied Gold Hound's
lien claim without considering whether its contributions-the
proprietary maps and software-might have contributed to the recovery,
it was deemed appropriate to reverse and remand the trial court's
decision for further evaluation of this issue. 223
A salvor's appeal in Girardv. MI YBLACKSHEEP,224 corrected earlier
(and erroneous) panel precedent as to the elements necessary to obtain a
salvage award. While at anchor a few hundred feet offshore at or near

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

See Salvors, Inc., 861 F.3d at 1282.
Id. at 1292-94.
Id. at 1294-95.
FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
Salvors, Inc., 861 F.3d at 1295.
Id. at 1298-99.
Id. at 1297-98.
Id. (quoting The BLACKWALL, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.), at 12).
Id. at 1298-99.
840 F.3d 1351 (11th Cir. 2016).
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Key West, Florida, a 125-foot yacht, known as the M/YBLACKSHEEP,
began to take on a significant amount of water after its port propeller
shaft dislocated from the gearbox. 225 The yacht's captain made a distress
call which was repeated by the U.S. Coast Guard to marine interests and
vessels in the area. Arnaud Girard, a professional maritime salvor,
responded within four minutes of the Coast Guard's message. 226 He
proceeded to dewater the M/ Y BLACKSHEEP and install a temporary
patch to limit the intake of water. The vessel was eventually towed into
dock by another entity. 227
Girard filed suit against the vessel, in rem, seeking a salvage award.
After a bench trial, the District Court for the Southern District of Florida
found that Girard was not entitled to such relief. Applying the test
outlined in Klein v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 228
the trial court determined that Girard failed to demonstrate that the
M/ Y BLACKSHEEP "could not have been rescued without the salvor's
assistance." 229 Girard appealed, arguing that the extra element of
showing (essentially) that "but for" the salvor's efforts the ship would
have been lost was incongruent with Supreme Court and United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit precedent. 230
In Klein, an Eleventh Circuit panel held that to receive a salvage
award, the salvor had to prove three elements: (1) a maritime peril from
which the ship could not have been rescued without the salvor's
assistance; (2) a voluntary act, not one bound by official or legal duty; and
(3) success in whole or part to save the property. 231 The district court
opined that Girard failed to show "what would have happened to the
Vessel had [he] not arrived on-scene," ostensibly required by the first
prong of Klein.232

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that Klein
wrongfully engrafted an additional requirement onto Supreme Court and
prior Fifth Circuit precedent vis-A-vis salvage awards. Specifically, the
first element under Klein-a marine peril from which the ship could not
have been rescued without the salvor's assistance-contained an
impermissible caveat that the salvor show that, but for his efforts, the
225. Id. at 1353.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. 758 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1985).
229. Girard, 840 F.3d at 1354.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1353.
232. Id. at 1354. "Because Mr. Girard failed to meet [his] burden under Klein by proving
that the ship 'could not have been rescued without his assistance,' the District Court found
that Mr. Girard was not entitled to a salvage award." Id. at 1353.
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vessel would have been lost. This is inconsistent with Supreme Court and
prior Fifth Circuit precedent, which requires only the showing of a
23
marine peril. 3

In conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit stripped the superfluous
requirement engrafted by Klein, removing the "but for" test erroneously
applied by the district court.234 The case was reversed and remanded for
determination of whether or not Girard contributed to saving the MI Y
235
BLACKSHEEP and, if so, the value of any award to be made.
X. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
236
the Eleventh Circuit
In Thacker v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
applicable to the
protections
immunity
sovereign
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addressed
of the United
agency
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The
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Authority
Valley
Tennessee
Tennessee
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on
dams
developing
with
States government charged
generation
power
and
control
flood
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River and its tributaries

services.

237

23
Although the Tennessee Valley Authority Act 8 expressly

provides that the entity
name,"'

239

"'

[m]ay sue and be sued in its corporate

Eleventh Circuit precedent holds that, "TVA cannot be subject

to liability when engaged in governmental functions that are
discretionary in nature." 240 In the instant case, one recreational boater
was killed and another seriously injured when the TVA attempted to
raise a downed power line and related equipment that was partially
submerged in the Tennessee River. 241 At the same moment the TVA
began to lift the electric conductor and the wire, the recreational vessel
passed through the area at a high rate of speed; the vessel and its
occupants struck the conductor, seriously injuring one occupant and
killing the other. 242 The TVA was sued for negligent acts, specifically (1)
failure to use reasonable care in assembly and installation of power lines
233. Id. at 1353-55. The appellate court held that the decision in Klein to add an extra
hurdle (demonstration of necessity) erroneously conflicted with prior Supreme Court and
panel precedent. It was therefore appropriate for a subsequent panel decision to remedy
this issue. Id. at 1355. The Court re-affirmed that the second and third elements of a
salvage award claim, as set out in Klein, do comport with precedent, and "thus remain good
law." Id. at 1355 n.2.
234. Id. at 1355.
235. Id.
236. 868 F.3d 979 (11th Cir. 2017).
237. Id. at 981.
238. 16 U.S.C. § 831(c) (2018).
239. Thacker, 868 F.3d at 981 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 831(b) (2018)).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 980.
242. Id.
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across the Tennessee River and (2) failure to exercise reasonable care to
warn boaters of the hazards the TVA created. 243 The district court
dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the
TVA enjoyed sovereign immunity from suit and no waiver of such
immunity was otherwise applicable. 244
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the work involved fell
within the TVA's discretionary function immunity. 245 The court's
analysis began by noting that the discretionary function exception
applies to TVA's commercial, power-generating activities. 246 The
discretionary function exception is distilled from the test developed for
Federal Tort Claims Act 247 cases, and involves a two-part test: (1)

whether the action is discretionary or a matter of choice, as opposed to a
task which is specifically directed or controlled by federal statute,
regulation, or policy; and (2) "whether the conduct at issue involves the
kind of judgment designed to be shielded by the discretionary function
exception." 248 In the case at bar, there was no specific federal statute,
regulation, or policy directing how the TVA employees should raise a
power line and equipment from the river. With respect to the second step,
the Eleventh Circuit agreed that the TVA's actions involved public policy
considerations which implicated allocation of resources, public safety,
costs concerns, and the like. 249 The appellate court affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based
on the TVA's immunity from suit.250

This result seems particularly harsh, leaving a seriously injured
boater and the survivors of the decedent without any recourse or remedy.
The decision states that the boaters were participating in a local fishing
tournament at the time of the accident. 251 There was no discussion of
whether or not the TVA was aware of the tournament and the
corresponding boat traffic in the area. Likewise, there was no discussion
of what steps the TVA took (if any) to warn boaters of the serious hazard
posed by stringing wire and equipment across an active waterway.

243. Id. at 982.
244. Id. at 980-81.
245. Id. at 983.
246. Id. at 981.
247. U.S.C. tit. 28 ch. 171 (2018).
248. Thacker, 868 F.3d at 983. This assessment is premised on the need to "prevent
judicial 'second-guessing' of... administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and
political policy through the medium of an action in tort." Id. (internal citations omitted).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 980.
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XI. MISCELLANEOUS

A. FairLabor StandardsAct
Freixa v. Prestige Cruise Services, LLC,252 is actually a Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA)25 3 case, involving calculation of overtime benefits
ostensibly due to an employee whose pay was based on commissions for
selling cruises. It may be of some benefit to counsel and their clients faced
with evaluating whether overtime compensation is due when employees
are paid salary plus commission.
During the period from December 7, 2013 to December 19, 2014, Sean
Freixa sold cruises for Prestige Cruise Services, LLC (Prestige). 254 He
received a fixed salary of $500 per week plus commissions. Freixa earned
over $70,000 in total compensation, the majority of which came from
commissions earned by selling cruises. 255 The commissions were
calculated and disbursed monthly, running approximately thirty days in
arrears (that is, Freixa's commissions were calculated monthly and
payments for the commissions were disbursed the following month). 256
Freixa sued for overtime pay, claiming that his compensation in certain
weeks fell below the minimum amount necessary for an employer to
avoid paying overtime compensation. 257
Freixa worked an average of sixty hours a week. The district court
divided his entire compensation for the year by sixty hours per week to
arrive at an average hourly rate of $23.45.258 Because this average hourly
pay exceeded the minimum threshold of $10.88 per hour, Prestige was
granted summary judgment on the overtime claim. 259
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded. 260 The court
explained the monthly commissions had to be allocated only among the
workweeks of the particular period during which they were earned: "The

252. 853 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2017).
253. U.S.C. tit. 29 ch. 8 (2018).
254. Frexia, 853 F.3d at 1345.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. Although the FLSA generally requires employees to be paid overtime for work
in excess of forty hours in a single week, the statute relieves an employer of this obligation
for retail or service workers who are paid commissions, as long as certain thresholds are
met. Id. at 1346.
258. Id. at 1346. The district court used an equitable exception to the general rule for
calculating overtime pay, allowing it to allocate commission payments across multiple
weeks if it was impractical to allocate commissions within the week(s) the money was
actually earned. Id. at 1347.
259. Id. at 1345-46.
260. Id. at 1348.
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district court erred when it allocated commissions earned in one month
across weeks worked in other months. Each commission payment that
Freixa received reflected 'commissions that were earned' within a single
month." 261 Although the parties agreed that Freixa averaged sixty hours
per workweek, they disagreed about the number of hours he worked in
any specific week or pay period. 262 This factual dispute precluded the use
of summary judgment, and the case was remanded for further
proceedings. 263
B. City of Riviera Beach v. Lozman: FinalAct?
No Eleventh Circuit Survey would be complete without reference to
Lozman and his floating house which, as the Supreme Court made clear,
was not a vessel. 264 The appellate court's decision in Lozman v. City of
Riviera Beach265 is the latest and perhaps last installment of this saga.
Fane Lozman, again proceeding pro se, appeals the district court's
judgment and several orders entered by the district court following
remand from the Supreme Court. 266
The case is notable, at the outset, for its extensive catalog of standards
of review applicable to the various and sundry issues raised by Lozman
on appeal. 267 The Eleventh Circuit proceeded to address Lozman's
grievances starting with the district court's determination that he was
only entitled to recover the fair market value of his home at the time of
268
Based on the evidence
its arrest, rather than its replacement value.

presented, the district court determined the fair market value to be
$7,500. The Eleventh Circuit agreed, finding no abuse of discretion and
269
that the valuation was supported by sufficient evidence.
Lozman also complained that the trial court erred in failing to assess
sanctions against the city for filing suit under the court's admiralty

261. Id. at 1347.
262. Id. at 1348.
263. Id.
264. See Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 568 U.S. 115 (2013). Lozman's floating home
was initially deemed to be a vessel, and "was arrested, sold, and destroyed pursuant to the
court's orders based on its mistaken belief that it had admiralty jurisdiction." Lozman v.
City of Riviera Beach, 672 F. App'x 892, 894 (11th Cir. 2016). This issue of "vessel status"
ultimately ended up before the Supreme Court which determined that the residencealthough borne by water-was not a vessel for admiralty jurisdiction purposes. Lozman,
568 U.S. at 131.
265. 672 F. App'x 892 (11th Cir. 2016).
266. Id. at 894.
267. Id. at 894-95.
268. Id. at 896-97.
269. Id.
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jurisdiction in the first place. This was also rejected by the Eleventh
Circuit, which observed that the Supreme Court itself felt there was
uncertainty among the circuits on the issue of vessel status and, thus,
the propriety of subject matter jurisdiction. 270 The court held that
sanctions were not appropriate, nor was Lozman-as a pro se litigantentitled to an award of attorney's fees. 271 Finally, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's refusal to disqualify itself at the behest of
Lozman. 272 The appellate court noted that, "Lozman's motion was
entirely based on disagreement with judicial orders and presented no
evidence of pervasive bias." 273

270.
271.
272.
273.

Id. at 898.
Id. at 898-99.
Id. at 899.
Id.

